U.S.S. TANG  (SS 306)

                         (A) PROLOGUE:

       Returned from  the 4th patrol on  3 September, 1944  and
  conducted  normal refit  at the  U.S.  Submarine Base,  Pearl
  Harbor.   In order to  take part on  the coming Formosa  raid
  and  to be  in a  position   inside  the Formosa  Straits  to
  intercept Japanese  reinforcements for the coming  Philippine
  Campaign, training  and loading were  completed four days  in
  advance  of schedule.   Loaded  24 Mark  18  Mod 1  torpedoes
  already prepared for the U.S.S. TAMBOR who had been delayed.


  24 September 1944

  1300 Departed for Formosa Strait via Midway, proceeding at
       full power to this last fueling base.

  27 September 1944

  0700 Moored  at Submarine  Base, Midway,  and received  their
       usual good  welcome and  services.  With  fuel in  every
       available corner, departed at noon for  our patrol area.
       Proceeding at two engine speed.

  27 September 1944 - 5 October 1944:
  (East Longitude Date)

       Routine training  enroute to  station showed  gratifying
       results.    Received  information  that  the  TRIGGER  -
       SUNFISH pack  were looking  for a small  Jap ship  whose
       last reported  position plotted directly  on our  track.
       We were apparently  ahead of these boats which had  left
       Pearl a  few hours  ahead of  us and  had proceeded  via
       Saipan, we  felt we stood a  good chance of finding  him

  6 October 1944:

       Ran into threatening  weather which soon developed  into
       a full-fledged typhoon.  Continued on  the surface still
       in  hope  of  intercepting the  enemy,  but  soon  found
       ourselves on the inside semi-circle, with  seas and wind
       which  would prohibit  any sort  of  attack if  he  were
       located.   The  barometer dropped  to  27.80, the  waves
       broke  over the  raised periscope,  and  even had  small
       waves on their  backs.  It was a  sight such as none  of
       us had  witnessed before.  Needless  to say, our  bridge
       watch had been  secured and the ship closed up,  running
       on the battery.   It was frankly considered too  late to
       dive  as we  often  hung at  60  degrees by  the  bubble
       inclinometer in  the control room.   What the  momentary
       extra loss  of stability  on diving,  especially if  the
       ballast  tanks  flooded  unevenly,  would  have  brought
       about is still a question in our minds.

  7 October 1944:

       Having worked through  to the safe side and with  slowly
       moderating sea, proceeded  toward Formosa Straits.   Our
       first  fix showed  us  having been  set  60 miles  in  a
       direction  opposite  to  that  which  we  steered  while
       pulling clear of the storm.

  8 October - 9 October 1944:

       As the sea permitted went to three-engine  speed.  Dived
       for one  plane which we  are quite sure  could flap  its
       wings however.

  10 October 1944:

       With the  mountains of Formosa in  view dead ahead  from
       noon on  and the  top of  Yonakuni Shima  rising on  our
       starboard hand, went to four-engine speed so  as to pass
       into the  Strait shortly  after dark.   About 2100  made
       contact with and tracked a small craft  which turned out
       to be  a patrol vessel when  observed from 5,000  yards.
       Put him  astern and continued on  past Kirun around  the
       northern tip  of Formosa inside Kahei  Sho and into  our

  11 October 1944;

                          ATTACK NO. 1

  0400 When  about four  miles west  of  Puki Kaku  made  radar
       contact at  17,000 yards on a  ship moving up the  coast
       from Pakusa  Point.  Tracked him  at 14 knots making  us
       at first suspicious  of his character, but as the  range
       closed he  was observed   to  be a  large modern  diesel
       freighter heavily  loaded presenting  a low  silhouette.
       Moved on to his  track and dived for one of  those never
       failing crack-of-dawn  attacks.  Maneuvered  for an  800
       yard shot as he came  by and fired three Mark 18  Mod. 1
       bow torpedoes,  spread to cover his  length.  The  first
       two hit  exactly as aimed  sinking this overloaded  ship
       immediately.  Surfaced as soon as the  smoke had cleared
       away to find no survivors and only  wreckage and several
       empty landing craft half swamped, drifting  about in the
       water.   Proceeded at full  power down the  coast for  a
       submerged  patrol  during  the day  well  clear  of  the
       opposition  which  would  arrive  shortly.    Dived  off
       Pakusa Point where a north or south bound  ship could be
       spotted    coming  in  either  direction,  permitting  a
       submerged attack  if necessary, but preferably  tracking
       until dark as these shallow waters  cramped any ordinary
       evasion  tactics.     The  west  coast  of  Formosa   is
       literally  covered with  airfields, and  planes were  in
       sight practically every periscope observation.

  1000 A   strong  northerly   wind  sprang   up  against   the
       prevailing  current which  quickly whipped  the  surface
       into a  sufficiently severe chop  to make depth  control
       difficult.  This  same chop, however, was seen to  stand
       us in good stead for at noon the masts  of another north
       bound freighter  were sighted  down the coast.   He  was
       running inside the  10 fathom curve zigging  frequently.
       Though we  could reach his  track by moving  in at  high
       speed  and  have  some battery  left  for  evasion,  our
       original plan of tracking till dark  seemed more prudent
       under  the  circumstances.   There  then  developed  our
       longest  submerged tracking  problem in  which we  moved
       with our  target 27  miles up  the coast.   This  seemed
       surprising  but with  the enemy  zigging frequently  and
       bucking a  heavy wind and sea,  his speed made good  was
       little more  than ours running on  a straight course  at
       80 feet between observations.  Our  tracks converged and
       he passed directly over us at sundown.

                          ATTACK NO. 2

       At dark  we surfaced 4,000 yards  astern of him,  passed
       him  up  at   the  same  range,  avoided  a  couple   of
       stationary patrols, moved  on to his track, then  turned
       for a  stern shot as he  came by.   The night was  black
       and spumey  permitting us to lie  with our stern to  him
       at 500 yards as he bucked the heavy seas.

  2100 With  a salvo  of three  ready to  fire  with a  liberal
       spread, fired  a single Mark  18 Mod. 1  torpedo at  his
       middle with  practically zero gyro on  a 75 port  track.
       Our experience  of the morning  was not a  mistake.   We
       were  clicking  and   this  one  hit  with  a   terrific
       explosion.   Only  the first  few members  of the  fire-
       control party  to reach the bridge  saw any of the  ship
       before it went  down.  We now experienced something  new
       in anti-submarine tactics in the nature  of estimated 40
       MM fire  from the beach.   It was directed straight  up,
       however, and we  were quite content to let them  believe
       that our China based planes were aloft.

       Proceeded  down the  coast avoiding  the two  stationary
       patrols  and  encountering  a  third  which  was  easily
       shaken off.

  12 - 14 October 1944:

  0100 Sighted  a   properly  lighted  hospital   ship  on   an
       northerly  course  which  we  looked  over   from  close
       aboard.   He appeared to be  in every respect  complying
       with International Law.

  0600  Commenced  submerged patrol  off Formosa  Coast.   Only
       patrol  boats and  planes  were sighted  throughout  the
       day.   On  surfacing proceeded  to  the northwest  to  a
       focal point  of the probable  shipping routes from  both
       Takao and Kirun to Foochow.  Foochow  seemed the logical
       destination  for any  Japanese shipping  in the  Formosa
       ports which, forewarned,  would be attempting to  escape
       from our carrier  strike.  It turned  out to be a  focal
       point, but only  for patrol craft.  Much rainy,  squally
       weather permitted getting  clear of them on the  surface
       after submerged approach, observation and evasion.

       Conducted  numerous  searches  along   enemy  retirement
       tracks until  Formosa strike  was completed.   On  these
       which lead up close  to Kirun the fires set by  our boys
       were observed to be blazing furiously day and night.

  16 - 17 October 1944:

       Moved over  to the China  coast and conducted  submerged
       periscope  patrol just  south of  Haitan  Island.   Only
       shipping  of a  thousand tons  or  less can  follow  the
      dangerous  channels  behind  this  island  group.    Our
       position  appeared  ideal to  intercept  any  worthwhile
       shipping   attempting  to   clear  the   Formosa   area.
       However, absolutely nothing  was sighted, and after  two
       days  in these  treacherous  waters we  moved  into  the
       center of the Strait.

  18 - 19 October 1944:

       Patrolled in  Formosa Strait,  encountering nothing  but
       patrol craft.   We were greeted  on surfacing by  radar-
       equipped  planes who  seemed  to be  assisted  in  their
       search by the patrol which also possessed radar.   As it
       appeared  to be  more of  a case  of  being hunted  than
       hunting, we moved  northeast to our original lucky  spot
       off Pakusa  Point, then  on around the  northern tip  of
       the island  to patrol off the  port of Kirun.   Friendly
       radar showed on our SJ to the east, probably  one of the
       TRIGGER - SILVERSIDES  group.  Other radar continued  to
       be  so  strong   on  our  detector  on  all  the   usual
       frequencies that we stopped worrying about  it except to
       fill in  the necessary  log to  help out  in its  future
       tabulation.      Patrolling   off   Kirun   was   almost
       prohibitable due to the constantly changing  weather and
       persistant large  swells.  The  strong currents made  it
       inadvisable to  go very  far into the  outer harbor  and
       the   actual  presence   of   shipping  could   not   be

  19 October 1944:

       Made radar  contact at  36,000 yards on  an enemy  group
       heading  south instead  of  north as  expected.    There
       followed  an approach  which  quickly developed  into  a
       trailing operation as  our target, a Katori cruiser  and
       two destroyers,  were making  19 knots.   Their  erratic
       zigs at least every three minutes permitted  us to close
       on the quarter  where with a bit  of luck or with  after
       torpedoes  an attack  would have  been  possible.   Five
       times in a row  we guessed wrong as to the  direction of
       his  next zig,  and firing  remained  impossible as  our
       slow Mark 18's  just plain wouldn't reach him before  he
       would have been off on another leg.

       As  it was  necessary to  slow  to twelve  knots  before
       releasing  these torpedoes,  and  the cruiser  would  be
       opening the  range during this  slowing down period,  it
       was  necessary to  reach a  position not  more than  600
       yards astern  of the  cruiser for  an up-the-tail  shot.
       Dawn was  approaching and so was  the Formosa Bank  just
       north  of  the  Poscaderas, when  we  crawled  into  800
       yards.   That  is as  far  as we  got, however,  for  he
       illuminated us.  We went down before  the bullets landed
       and expected a  severe drubbing from depth charges.   We
       were disappointed in  the outcome and swore never to  be
       without steam torpedoes forward again.

       The enemy evidently  suspected other submarines and  did
       not release  the escorts  to work  us over.   A air  and
       surface craft  search started  about noon,  but we  were
       well to  the north of their  probing.  On surfacing  the
       Hunt was still  on and with a  sick radar we went  north
       clear of the  Strait for repairs and a little  rest from
       almost continuous operations.

  21 October 1944:

       Continued submerged patrol  north of the Formosa  Strait
       then proceeded  back to the China  Coast off   Turnabout

  2100 Tracked  and  nearly  fired  on  a   PC-DE  type  patrol
       proceeding down  the coast in dark  stormy weather.   We
       didn't  like the  look of  the  situation as  seas  were
       rolling  nearly over  our bridge  and  his erratic  zigs
       made a  surface attack precarious.   When the range  was
       2600 yards with  angle on the bow about  30 d, as if  by
       mutual  consent  the enemy  reversed  course  and  high-
       tailed it.  We  did likewise probably as happy as  he at
       the outcome.   Our evasion course headed us back  toward
       the  Formosa  coast  so continued  on  for  a  submerged
       patrol on the following day.

  22 October 1944:

       Continued  on toward  the coast  commencing a  submerged
       patrol at about 1000.  The usual  numerous aircraft were
       sighted  during  the  day.   Their  quantity  and  types
       indicating an influx of planes probably  as replacements
       for those  destroyed during the  Formosa raids and  very
       possibly also for support in the Philippines.

  1800 Shortly   after   surfacing   the   SJ    radar   became
       temperamental   and  quit.     Our   industrious   radar
       technician  and  officer commenced  the  usual  non-stop
       repairs.  Headed north for a safer  operating area until
       the  were  completed,  as  this  was  no   place  to  be
       operating without an SJ.

  23 October 1944:

                          ATTACK NO. 3

  0050 On  the first  trial of  the  revamped SJ  the  operator
       reported land  at 10,00 yards where  no land should  be.
       Commenced tracking, immediately discovering a  small pip
       moving out  in our direction.   Put him astern and  bent
       on the  turns.  He evidently  lost his original  contact
       on us for  he changed course and commenced a  wide swing
       about  the  convoy which  was  now  also in  sight.    A
       submariner's dream quickly developed as we  were able to
       assume  the original  position  of this  destroyer  just
       ahead  of  the   convoy  while  he  went  on  a   2-mile
       inspection  tour.   The convoy  was  comprised of  three
       large tankers  in column, a  transport on the  starboard
       hand, a freighter  on the port hand, flanked by  DE's in
       both beams and quarters.  After zigging  with the convoy
       in position  3,000 yards ahead  we dropped back  between
       the  tankers and  the  freighter.   On  the  next  zig.,
       stopped and turned  right for nearly straight bow  shots
       at the  tankers as  they came by,  firing two  torpedoes
       under the  stack and  engine room space  of the  nearest
       tanker, a  single torpedo into  the protruding stern  of
       the middle tanker and two torpedoes under  the stack and
       engine space of  the far tanker.  The minimum  range was
       300 yards  and the  maximum 800 yards.   Torpedoes  were
       exploding before  the firing was  completed and all  hit
       as  aimed.    It was  a  terrific  sight  to  see  three
       blazing, sinking  tankers but  there was  only time  for
       just  a  glance,  as  the  freighter   was  in  position
       crossing our stern.  Completed the set-up  and was about
       to  fire on  this vessel  when  Leibold, my  Boatswain's
       Mate, whom  I've used for  an extra set  of eyes on  all
       patrols,  properly   diagnosed  the  maneuvers  of   the
       starboard transport who  was coming in like a  destroyer
       attempting to  ram.   We were  boxed in  by the  sinking
       tankers, the transport was too close for us  to dive, so
       we had  to cross  his bow.   It was  really a  thriller-
       diller with  the TANG  barely getting on  the inside  of
       his turning circle  and saving the stern with full  left
       rudder in  the last  seconds.   The transport  commenced
       firing with  large and  small caliber  stuff so  cleared
       the bridge before realizing it was all  above our heads.
       A  quick glance  aft, however,  showed  the tables  were
       again turned  for the transport  was forced to  continue
       her  swing in  an attempt  to avoid  colliding with  the
       freighter which  had also been  coming in to  ram.   The
       freighter  struck  the  transport's   starboard  quarter
       shortly after we commenced firing four  torpedoes spread
       along their double length.  At a range of  400 yards the
       crash  coupled  with the  four  torpedo  explosions  was
       terrific,  sinking   the  freighter  nose  down   almost
       instantly while the transport hung with a 30d up angle.

       The  destroyer  was  now  coming  in  on  our  starboard
       quarter at  1300 yards  with DE's  on our  port bow  and
       beam.  We headed for the DE on our bow so as  to get the
       destroyer  astern and  gratefully  watched the  DE  turn
       away, he apparently  having seen enough.  Our  destroyer
       still  hadn't lighted  off  another boiler  and  it  was
       possible to  open the  angle slowly,  avoiding the  last
       interested  DE.   When the  radar range  to  the DD  was
       4,500 yards  he gave up  the chase and  returned to  the
       scene of the transport.   We moved back also as  his bow
       still  showed on  the radar  and  its pip  was  visible.
       When we were  6,000 yards off, however, another  violent
       explosion took place  and the bow disappeared both  from
       sight and  the radar screen.   This explosion set off  a
       gun duel  amongst the destroyer  and escort vessels  who
       fired at random  apparently sometimes at each other  and
       sometimes just out into the night.   Their confusion was
       truly complete.  It looked like a good place  to be away
       from so we cleared the area at full power until dawn.

       Our attack log showed that only 10  minutes elapsed from
       the time  of firing our first  torpedo until that  final
       explosion when the transport's bow went down.

  0600 Dived north of the Strait for submerged patrol.

  2000 Surfaced.   Nothing but patrol  boats were  sighted
       during the  day, but at  night a search  similar to  the
       one previously encountered indicated the  possibility of
       this being a trap.   In any case there was  little doubt
       about the heat  being on this area.  Headed  north where
       deeper water  would at least give  us a better sense  of

  24 October 1944:

  0600 Commenced submerged periscope  patrol.  On surfacing  at
       dark headed for  Turnabout Island feeling that the  Japs
       would  sow  scarcely  run  traffic  other  than  in  the
       shallow  protected waters  along the  China  Coast.   On
       approaching  the islands  at  a range  of  35,ooo  yards
       other than land pips appeared on the  radar screen until
       at tracking ranges the SJ was absolutely saturated.

       The  Staff had  been correct  in their  estimate of  the
       situation  that the  Japanese  would likely  send  every
       available ship  in support of  the Philippine  Campaign.
       The  Leyte Campaign  was in  progress and  the ships  of
       this convoy as in  the one on the 23rd were  all heavily
       loaded.   The tankers  all carried planes  on deck,  and
       even the  bows and sterns of  the transports were  piled
       high with apparent plane crates.

                          ATTACK NO. 4

       The convoy was  tracked on courses following the  ragged
       coast  at 12  knots.   The  Japanese  became  suspicious
       during our  initial approach, two escorts commencing  to
       run on opposite course to the long  column, firing busts
       of 40mma and  5" salvos.  As  we continued to close  the
       leading   ships,   the   escort   commander   obligingly
       illuminated  the column  with 36"  or 40"  searchlights,
       using this to  signal with.  It  gave us a perfect  view
       of our  first selected target, a  three deck, two  stack
       transport;  of  the  second target,  a  three  deck  one
       stacker; and of the third, a large modern  tanker.  With
       ranges from  1400 yards  on the first  transport to  900
       yards on the tanker, fired two Mk. 18  torpedoes each in
       slow deliberate  salvoes to  pass under  the middle  and
       stack of  the tanker.   In spite of  the apparent  early
       warning and the  sporadic shooting which was  apparently
       designed  to scare  the  submarine, no  evasive  tactics
       were  employed by  any  of  the ships.    The  torpedoes
       commenced hitting as we paralleled the  convoy to search
       our  next two  targets.   Our  love  for Mk.  18  Mod  1
       torpedoes  after the  disappointing  cruiser  experience
       was  again restored  as all  torpedoes hit  nicely.   We
       passed the next  ship, a medium freighter, abeam at  600
       yards  and then  turned  for  a stern  shot  at  another
       tanker  and transport  astern of  her.   Fired a  single
       stern torpedo  under the  tankers stack and  one at  the
       foremast and one at the mainmast of the  transport.  The
       ranges  were between  600 and  700 yards.   Things  were
       anything but calm and peaceful now, for  the escorts had
       stopped their  warning tactics and  were directing  good
       salvoes at us  and the blotches of smoke we  left behind
       on going to full  power to clear the melee.   Just after
       firing  at  the  transport,  a   full-fledged  destroyer
       charged under her  stern and headed our way and  exactly
       what took place  in the following seconds will never  be
       determined, but the  tanker was hit nicely and blew  up,
       apparently a gasoline loaded job.  At  least one torpedo
       was observed to  hit the transport and an instant  later
       the  destroyer blew  up, either  intercepting our  third
       torpedo  or possibly  the 40mm  fire from  the two  DE's
       bearing down on our  beam.  In any case, the  result was
       the same and only the transport remained  afloat and she
       apparently stopped.

       We  were as  yet untouched,  all  gunfire either  having
       cleared over our heads or being directed  at the several
       blurps  of  smoke  we emitted  when  pleading  for  more
       speed.   When 10,000  yards from the  transport we  were
       all in the  clear so stopped to look over  the situation
       and  re-check our  last  two torpedoes  which  had  been
       loaded forward during our stern tube attack.

       A half hour was spent with each  torpedo, withdrawing it
       from the tube, ventilating the battery  and checking the
       rudders  and  gyros.    With  everything   in  readiness
       started cautiously back in to get our cripple.   The two
       DE's  were patrolling  on his  seaward side,  so made  a
       wide  sweep and  came  in very  slow  so as  not  to  be
       detected even by sound.  She was lower in  the water but
       not definitely sinking.   Checking our speed by pit  log
       at  6 knots,  fired our  23rd  torpedo from  900  yards,
       aimed  just  forward  of her  mainmast.    Observed  the
       phosphorescent  wake heading  as aimed  at our  crippled
       target,  fired  our   24th  and  last  torpedo  at   his
       foremast.  Rang up emergency speed as  this last torpedo
       broached  and curved  sharply to  the  left.   Completed
       part  of a  fishtail maneuver  in  a futile  attempt  to
       clear the turning  circle of this erratic circular  run.
       The torpedo was observed through about 180d  of its turn
       due  to the  phosphorescence of  its  wake.   It  struck
       abreast the after torpedo room with  a violent explosion
       about 20  seconds after firing.   The tops  were   blown
       off the  only regular  ballast tanks aft  and the  after
       three compartments flooded instantly.  The  Tang sank by
       the stern  much as you would  drop a pendulum  suspended
       in a horizontal  position.  There was insufficient  time
       even to  carry out the  last order to  close the  hatch.
       One  consolation for  those of  us washed  off into  the
       water  was  the  explosion  of  our   23rd  torpedo  and
       observation of  our last target  settling by the  stern.
       Those who  escaped in the morning,  were greeted by  the
       transport's bow  sticking straight  out of  the water  a
       thousand yards or so away.

                           (C) WEATHER

       Normal for locality patrol.

                      (D) TIDAL INFORMATION


                      (E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

       As listed in navigational aids.

                       (F)  SHIP CONTACTS

       See narrative.

                      (G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

       See narrative.

                         (H) ATTACK DATA

       See attached report forms.  (not transcribed)

                  (R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

       Not available due to loss of records in TANG.

                          (S) DURATION

       Days enroute to area          15
       Days in area                  14
       Days enroute to base          --
       Days submerged                10


       Torpedoes      Fuel      Provisions   Personnel  Factor
                      Gals.        Days              Days
          0            --          --                 --


       Not available due to loss of records in TANG.

                           (V) REMARKS

       Report of the loss of the U.S.S. TANG  (SS 306)


       This  report is  compiled from  my  observation and  the
  stories of the eight other survivors as related to  me at the
  first opportunity after capture.

       The U.S.S.  TANG took on board  the twenty-four Mark  18
  Mod 1 electric  torpedoes prepared for the U.S.S. TAMBOR  who
  was being  delayed.  All  torpedo personnel in  the TANG  had
  attended  electric torpedo  school and  it  is assured  these
  torpedoes were properly routined while on station.   In fact,
  the performance  of the first  twenty-three torpedoes in  all
  running perfectly, with twenty-two hits, attests to this.

       The last  two torpedoes were loaded  in tubes three  and
  four  during the  final stern  tube  attack.   After  pulling
  clear  of the  enemy  escorts opportunity  was  available  to
  spend an  hour checking  these torpedoes  before closing  the
  enemy to sink a cripple.  They were  partially withdrawn from
  the  tubes, batteries  ventilated,  gyro pots  inspected  and
  steering mechanism observed to be operating freely.

       With the submarine  speed checking at six knots and  the
  ship  conned for  zero  gyro, the  twenty-third  torpedo  was
  fired.   When its  phosphorescent wake  was observed  heading
  for  its point  of aim  on the  stopped  transport, the  last
  torpedo  was fired  from  tube  number four.    This  torpedo
  curved sharply to  the left, broaching during the first  part
  of  its  turn  and  then  porpoising  during  the  remainder.
  Emergency speed  was called for  and answered immediately  on
  firing, and  a fishtail  maneuver partially  completed in  an
  attempt to get  clear of the torpedo's turning circle.   This
  resulted only in  the torpedo striking the stern abreast  the
  after torpedo room instead of amidships.

       The  explosion  was very  violent,  whipping  the  boat,
  breaking H.P. air lines, lifting deck plates,  etc.  Numerous
  personnel as far forward as the control  room received broken
  limbs and other  injuries.  The immediate result to  the ship
  was  to flood  the  after three  compartments  together  with
  number six  and seven  ballast tanks.   No  one escaped  from
  these compartments and even the forward engine  room was half
  flooded before the after door could be secured.

       The ship, with no normal positive buoyancy  aft and with
  three after flooded compartments, went down  instantly by the
  stern.   With  personnel  in the  conning  tower and  on  the
  bridge falling aft  due to the angle, there was  insufficient
  time to carry out the order to close the hatch.

       Personnel in the  control room succeeded in closing  the
  conning tower  lower hatch, but  it had been  jimmied in  the
  explosion and leaked  badly.  They then leveled the  boat off
  by flooding  number two main ballast  tank (opening the  vent
  manually) and proceeded to the forward  torpedo room carrying
  the injured in blankets.

       When  the survivors  from the  forward  engine room  and
  after battery compartments  reached the mess room, the  found
  water already above  the eye-port in the door to  the control
  room.   On testing the bulkhead  flappers in the  ventilation
  piping they  found the water  not yet at  this height.   They
  therefore, opened the  door, letting the water race  through,
  then proceeded on to the torpedo room.  This made  a total of
  about thirty men to reach an escape position.

       During   this   time   all   secret   and   confidential
  publications were destroyed  first by burning in the  control
  room,  and then  in the  forward battery  compartment as  the
  control room flooded.  This latter seems  unfortunate since a
  great deal of the smoke entered the forward torpedo room.

       Escaping  was  delayed  by  the  presence   of  Japanese
  patrols  which  ran   close  by  dropping  occasional   depth
  charges.  This  is unfortunate for an electrical fire  in the
  forward battery  was becoming  severe.   Commencing at  about
  six  o'clock, four  parties  left  the ship,  but  only  with
  difficulty as  the pressure  at one hundred  and eighty  feet
  made  numerous  returns  to the  torpedo  room  necessary  to
  revive prostrate men.

       At the time the last party escaped,  the forward battery
  fire had  reached such  intensity that paint  on the  forward
  torpedo room after  bulkhead was scorching and running  down.
  Considerable pressure  had built  up in  the forward  battery
  making it  difficult to  secure the after  torpedo room  door
  sufficiently tight  to prevent  acrid smoke  from seeping  by
  the gasket.   It was felt that  this gasket blew out,  either
  due  to the  pressure or  an ensuing  battery explosion,  and
  that the remaining personnel were asphyxiated.

       Of  the thirteen  men who  escaped,  five were  able  to
  cling to the buoy until picked up.  Three  others reached the
  surface, but  were unable to hang  on or breathe and  floated
  off and drowned.  The other five were not  seen after leaving
  the trunk.

       Of the nine officers and men on the bridge, three were
  able to swim throughout the night and until picked up eight
  hours later. One officer escaped from the flooded conning
  tower and remained afloat until rescued with the aid of his
  trousers converted to a life raft.

       The Destroyer Escort which picked up all nine survivors
  was one of the four which were rescuing Japanese troops and
  personnel. When we realized that our clubbings and kickings
  were being administered by the burned, mutilated survivors
  of our own handiwork, we found we could take it with less